In this award-winning study of the _Phaedrus_, Charles Griswold focuses on the theme of "self-knowledge." Relying on the principle that form and content are equally important to the dialogue's meaning, Griswold shows how the concept of self-knowledge unifies the profusion of issues set forth by Plato. Included are a new preface and an updated comprehensive bibliography of works on the _Phaedrus_.

Features the full text of "Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method," by Charles L. Creegan. Discusses the works and theories of Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).

A biography of the foremost Christian humanist of the Renaissance who devoted his life to uplifting man's condition through faith, reason, and education.

Originally published by Routledge in 1988, this pioneering collection of essays now features a new preface and updated bibliography by the editor, reflecting the most significant developments in Plato scholarship during the past decade.

Philosophers have debated whether the advance directives of Alzheimer’s patients should be enforced, even if patients seem content in their demented state. The debate raises deep questions about the nature of human autonomy and personal identity. But it tends to proceed on the assumption that the advance directive’s terms are clear, whereas in practice they are often vague or ambiguous, requiring the patient’s healthcare proxy to make difficult judgment calls. This practical wrinkle raises its own, distinct but related, philosophical question: (...) what criteria may the proxy bring to bear when making such interpretive judgments on which the patient’s life may depend? After defending a general policy of enforcing advance directives on normative (rather than metaphysical) grounds, I argue that when advance directives are vague, a patient’s proxy may permissibly make her own fresh evaluation of the patient’s life as a whole and, in so doing, consider how the patient’s character as a demented person contributes or fails to contribute to that life. (shrink)

Psychologists can measure normalcy, define madness, develop therapeutic paradigms, and list the nuances of human behavior with utmost precision. We have biofeedback, psychometrics, psychoanalysis, cognitive therapy, positive psychology, behavior modification, and a host of deeply promising projects in the research and development pipeline. To be sure, our discipline has advanced accurate understanding of the soul's essential properties and has scientifically harnessed this knowledge to clinically mitigate the deep agony of the human mind. But, despite our advances and genuine effectiveness, our (...) discipline remains incomplete. Theoretically, scientifically, and therapeutically, we fall short of the fuller effectuality that awaits us. We need Christ. It is through the Christian revelation that psychology will find its maturity. For psychology there are blessings afoot. These blessings stem from our recognition that the Clinical Christ - the activity of the God of the Christian revelation throughout the realms of our discipline - desires to redeem, relate, heal, love, and empower us. The chapters of this book explore different aspects of the Clinical Christ, Christian Holism, and their implications. A central tenet of Christian Holism is that the Holy Spirit is fully present in the clinical situation, with and within the therapist and the client, and is actively engaged in the treatment process. Ten further tenets proceeding from the central tenet are described. Other chapters include treatment of the importance of forgiveness, reconciliation and dream work in the practice of Christian Holism. There is copious material in other chapters citing significant research data validating health benefits of Christian prayer and spirituality, the need for the Church to restore the healing ministry and energetic components of Christian prayer and spirituality. (shrink)

The discrepancy between English if's and the horseshoe is far from being negligible. That is not a reason for distrusting the horseshoe, which is useful so long as it is taken to mean just what it is defined to mean; and it is not a reason for distrusting our English if's, which in spite of their ambiguities are indispensable to our daily discourse. But it is a reason for distrusting the current logical pedagogy that leads students to take the two (...) as being intertranslatable. So if symbolic logic is to help us in our English arguments (and that should surely be one of its functions) it needs to be supplemented: it needs to be provided with additional symbols (presumably with the introduction of one or more primitive concepts) that will preserve the meaning of our various if's with greater accuracy. In the present paper I shall point in the direction of such a logic. I cannot undertake to develop it in a complete postulational form; but I can at least call attention to certain English locutions by which the required postulates should be guided. And I can venture to state some of the postulates using appropriate symbols. (shrink)

My reflections on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial were provoked some time ago in a quite natural way, by a visit to the memorial itself. I happened upon it almost by accident, a fact that is due at least in part to the design of the Memorial itself . I found myself reduced to awed silence, and I resolved to attend the dedication ceremony on November 13, 1982. It was an extraordinary event, without question the most moving public ceremony I have (...) ever attended. But my own experience of the Memorial on that and other occasions is far from unique. It is almost commonplace among the many visitors to the VVM—now the most visited of all the memorials in Washington—a fact so striking as to have compelled journalists, art historians, and architects to write countless articles about the monument. And although philosophers traditionally have had little to say about architecture in general or about that of memorials in particular, there is much in the VVM and its iconography worthy of philosophical reflection. Self-knowledge includes, I hazard to say, knowledge of ourselves as members of the larger social and political context, and so includes knowledge of that context.Architecture need not memorialize or symbolize anything; or it may symbolize, but not in a memorializing way, let alone in a way that is tied to a nation’s history. The structures on the Washington Mall belong to a particular species of recollective architecture, a species whose symbolic and normative content is prominent. After all, war memorials by their very nature recall struggles to the death over values. Still further, the architecture by which a people memorializes itself is a species of pedagogy. It therefore seeks to instruct posterity about the past and, in so doing, necessarily reaches a decision about what is worth recovering. It would thus be a mistake to try to view such memorials merely “aesthetically,” in abstraction from all judgments about the noble and the base. To reflect philosophically on specific monuments, as I propose to do here, necessarily requires something more than a simply technical discussion of the theory of architecture or of the history of a given species of architecture. We must also understand the monument’s symbolism, social context, and the effects its architecture works on those who participate in it. That is, we must understand the political iconography which shapes and is shaped y the public structure in question. To do less than this—if I may state a complex argument in hopelessly few words—is to fall short of the demands of true objectivity, of an understanding of the whole which the object is. To understand the meaning of the VVM requires that we understand, among other things, what the memorial means to those who visit it. This is why my observations about the dedication of the VVM and about the Memorial’s continuing power over people play an important role in this essay. Charles L. Griswold, associate professor of philosophy at Howard University, is the author of Self-Knowledge in Plat’s “Phaedrus” and has published widely in the areas of Greek philosophy, German Idealism, hermeneutics, and political philosophy. He is an editor of the Independent Journal of Philosophy and a recipient of numerous awards and fellowships. Currently he is working on a project which centers on Adam Smith’s notion of the “self” and Smith’s relationship to Stoicism and to the American Founding. (shrink)

In hospital rooms across the country, doctors, nurses, patients, and their families grapple with questions of life and death. Recently, they have been joined at the bedside by a new group of professional experts, bioethicists, whose presence raises a host of urgent questions. How has bioethics evolved into a legitimate specialty? When is such expertise necessary? How do bioethicists make their decisions? And whose interests do they serve? Renowned sociologist Charles L. Bosk has been observing medical care for thirty-five (...) years. In What Would You Do? he brings his extensive experience to bear on these questions while reflecting on the ethical dilemmas that his own ethnographic research among surgeons and genetic counselors has provoked. Bosk considers whether the consent given to ethnographers by their subjects can ever be fully voluntary and informed. He questions whether promises of confidentiality and anonymity can or should be made. And he wonders if social scientists overestimate the benefits of their work while downplaying the risks. Vital for practitioners of both the newly prominent field of bioethics and the long-established craft of ethnography, What Would You Do? will also engross anyone concerned with how our society addresses difficult health care issues. (shrink)

There are intriguing congruities between Kierkegaard and some recent tendencies in feminism and post-modern thought.1 Neither Kierkegaard, feminists, nor post-modernism are systematic (that's one congruity right there!), so the common points can't be neatly tabulated. But (again typically of all the parties concerned) they tend to lie in three areas: methodology, communicative strategy, and the rejection of procrustean metaphysics. In what follows I will try to assemble some fragments which point out these congruities.

_The Handbook of Dewey’s Educational Theory and Practice_ provides a comprehensive, accessible, richly theoretical yet practical guide to the educational theories, ideals, and pragmatic implications of the work of John Dewey, America’s preeminent philosopher of education.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith are giants of eighteenth century thought. The heated controversy provoked by their competing visions of human nature and society still resonates today. Smith himself reviewed Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality, and his perceptive remarks raise an intriguing question: what would a conversation between these two great thinkers look like? In this outstanding book Charles Griswold analyses, compares and evaluates some of the key ways in which Rousseau and Smith address what could be termed "the question (...) of the self." Both thinkers discuss what we are by nature, who we have become, whether we can know ourselves or each other, how best to articulate the human condition, what it would mean to be free, and whether there is anything that can be done to remedy our deeply imperfect condition. In the course of examining their rich and contrasting views, Griswold puts Rousseau and Smith in dialogue by imagining what they might say in reply to one another. Griswold's wide-ranging exploration includes discussion of issues such as narcissism, self-falsification, sympathy, the scope of philosophy, and the relation between liberty, religion and civic order. A superb exploration of two major philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith: A Philosophical Encounter is essential reading for students and scholars of these two figures, eighteenth century philosophy, the Enlightenment, moral philosophy, the history of ideas. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as political theory, economics, and religion. (shrink)

Current theories suggest that the brain is the sole source of mental illness. However, affective disorders, and major depressive disorder (MDD) in particular, may be better conceptualized as brain-body disorders that involve peripheral systems as well. This perspective emphasizes the embodied, multifaceted physiology of well-being, and suggests that afferent signals from the body may contribute to cognitive and emotional states. In this review, we focus on evidence from preclinical and clinical studies suggesting that afferent thermosensory signals contribute to well-being and (...) depression. Although thermoregulatory systems have traditionally been conceptualized as serving primarily homeostatic functions, increasing evidence suggests neural pathways responsible for regulating body temperature may be linked more closely with emotional states than previously recognized, an affective warmth hypothesis. Human studies indicate that increasing physical warmth activates brain circuits associated with cognitive and affective functions, promotes interpersonal warmth and prosocial behavior, and has antidepressant effects. Consistent with these effects, preclinical studies in rodents demonstrate that physical warmth activates brain serotonergic neurons implicated in antidepressant-like effects. Together, these studies suggest that (1) thermosensory pathways interact with brain systems that control affective function, (2) these pathways are dysregulated in affective disorders, and (3) activating warm thermosensory pathways promotes a sense of well-being and has therapeutic potential in the treatment of affective disorders. (shrink)

Charles L. Stevenson; V—Reflections on John Dewey's Ethics, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 77–98, https://doi.o.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Should We Live Forever? The Ethical Ambiguities of Aging by Gilbert MeilaenderCharles L. Kammer IIIShould We Live Forever? The Ethical Ambiguities of Aging Gilbert Meilaender grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2013. 135 pp. $18.00.Should We Live Forever? The Ethical Ambiguities of Aging provides a helpful focus on both aging and research being done to extend human life expectancy. As Gilbert Meilaender notes, human beings have always longed for an (...) extended as well as a more generative life span. He raises the question, however, of whether these two desires stand in opposition. Built into our very biology is the “survival instinct,” along with the imaginative ability to transcend our biological limits. Together they generate a religious legacy of imagining life after death. But Meilaender believes we have moved into a different time. Citing John Gray, he asserts that “the hope of life after death has been replaced by the faith that death can be defeated” (xi).Meilaender presents scientific research on antiaging while observing that there is little cultural reflection on its impacts or desirability. This book steps in to provide a reflection on these larger questions from the perspective of the virtues, or what constitutes a truly “good and human” life. As the author notes, our reflections on aging and immortality are tied to our assumptions of what it means to be human. This is evident, for example, among members of the transhumanist movement, which envisions a human brain freed from dependence on a biological body. He surmises that our scientific quest for immortality may have its roots in the human quest to overcome contingency and its associated anxiety; it is in many ways the embodiment of our wish to be “gods” who have total control over our destinies.Meilaender uses classic and modern Western philosophers and theologians (including Aristotle, Augustine, Søren Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth) as well as the work of life-stage theorists (Erik Erikson and Bernard Williams) who contribute to the discussion of what constitutes a “fully human life.” Would biological immortality make a life more fully human, or is it rooted in a crass form of narcissism that makes our own survival more important than the needs and perhaps even the possibility of future generations?The book closes with a brief conversation between three friends who represent different perspectives, a useful discussion tool for raising the deeper issues presented in the book. According to the first view, we are biological organisms with prescribed natural limits; fulfillment therefore comes through accepting and finding provisional fulfillment in each of our life stages. The [End Page 216] second perspective sees human freedom and reason as the fundamental characteristics of being human and so advocates expanding life expectancy and following wherever human creativity leads. The third observes that we are constrained by our biology and yet are also free, both bound and transcendent. This perspective, however, notes that what we truly desire is not an indefinite extension of life but something richer and fuller that transcends any possibility that humans can create. Our longing is not actually a desire for more but a desire for something other than what continued existence can provide.Meilaender’s engagement of the deeper questions presented by the scientific attempt to “cure” aging and extend life indefinitely is, finally, a powerful Christian apologetic that is nevertheless respectful of other positions. If the book has a limitation, it lies in the failure to engage non-Western traditions that perceive and address the issues from much different frameworks. It also does not address the possibility that perhaps being human is to live with the awareness and resignation that, while we have a deep desire for something qualitatively fuller and richer, this is a longing that can never be fulfilled.Charles L. Kammer IIIThe College of WoosterCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)